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INTRODUCTION
It is, of course, trite law that the inclusion of a retention of title clause in a
contract for the sale of goods renders the contract an agreement to sell rather
than a sale 1 and property in the goods does not pass until the stipulated
condition has been met. 2 As such, if the purchaser of the goods becomes
insolvent whilst the price remains unpaid the supplier, having retained
ownership in the goods supplied, can retake the goods ahead of the purchaser's
other creditors. The supplier will also have the ability to sue for damages for
breach of the agreement to sell although typically this right will be worthless as
the purchaser will not have the funds necessary to satisfy a judgment debt.
So much is well settled. But the issue becomes more complicated where the
goods which have been supplied are mixed with other goods. For example, a
manufacturer might mix together raw goods which have been supplied to its
premises but which still have not been paid for, producing a completely new
species of goods as a product. If the supplier of the raw goods included a
retention of title clause in the agreement to sell, does it have greater rights over
the new product than the manufacturer's other creditors? Is the answer to that
• Senior Judges' Clerk, Court of Appeal of New Zealand. I am indebted to Professor 1.
K. Maxton of the University of Auckland for her kind assistance during the preparation of this
article. Naturally (perhaps unfortunately) she cannot be blamed for any shortcomings which
remain.
1 Sale of Goods Act 1908 (NZ), s. 3(4) and Sale of Goods Act 1979 (UK), ss. 2(4) and
2(5).
Sale of Goods Act 1908 (NZ), s. 3(5) and Sale of Goods Act 1979 (UK), s. 2(6).
23
THE DENNING LAW JOURNAL
question any different if the clause stipulated not only that the supplier retained
ownership in the raw goods, but also that it would own any new goods created
from the raw goods unless and until the raw goods are paid for?
These are by no means new questions and they have been considered
judicially before now. However, it will be suggested in this article that the
conclusions which the courts have arrived at cannot withstand theoretical
assault. In particular, the orthodox position that is that where a supplier of raw
goods retains title in those goods until they are paid for it has no proprietary
interest in a new species of goods created from those raw goods, will be
challenged. Second, the orthodox conclusion that the inclusion of a retention of
title clause which purports to retain to the supplier full title to any newly
created species involves the creation of a charge which is void as against the
liquidator and creditors of the purchaser company if it is not registered, will be
disputed.
Before proceeding with the theoretical analysis it is perhaps convenient at
this juncture to mention a point of nomenclature. In the balance of the paper
reference to a 'simple' retention of title clause indicates a clause which makes
the passing of property conditional upon payment of the price of the goods.
This is to be distinguished from a 'products' retention oftide clause which
purports to 'retain' for the supplier title to any new products which may be
created from the raw goods being supplied. It is perhaps also useful to notice
that where a products clause is incorporated in a contract for the sale of goods
the contract will usually also include a simple clause. The intended effect of
this symbiosis is to ensure that the supplier is protected against the insolvency
of the purchaser both whilst the raw goods remain unused as well as after they
have been utilised in a manufacturing process such that they comprise an
irreducible part of a newly manufactured product. The question which must be
considered is whether these clauses can achieve their intended effect?
To facilitate the theoretical re-appraisaljust promised it is pertinent to
delineate and analyse separately three distinct scenarios. The first is where
goods have been supplied subject to a simple retention of title clause and, prior
to payment for the goods, they are mixed with other goods of the same species.
The second and third scenarios are those which have already been mentioned
and which are the focus of this article. These are the situations where goods are
sold subject to a simple retention of title clause and the goods are mixed with
other goods to create an entirely new species, and, finally, where a new product
is created from the goods supplied but in addition to a simple clause the
supplier has also included a products clause in the contract.
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MIXING GOODS OF THE SAME SPECIES
Where a purchaser has obtained possession of goods supplied subject to a
simple retention of title clause the issue of the ownership of those goods is
determined by the retention of title clause: property will not pass until the price
is paid and in the interim title remains with the supplier. However, it is a
common commercial practice, particularly where raw goods are supplied to a
manufacturer, for goods of the same species to be stored together even although
the goods have been supplied by different parties, some of whom have
employed simple retention of title clauses. The question then is, who owns the
mixture?
The answer to that question depends upon two levels of analysis. First, if the
goods are of such a nature that it is possible to identify to whom each belongs
then the retention of title clause operates as if there had been no mixing and the
goods continue to belong to each supplier just as they had prior to being
congregated. Thus, for example, if antique chairs which have been supplied
subject to a simple retention of title clause are placed in a warehouse pending
payment along with several plastic moulded chairs, it is clearly possible to
determine which chairs belong to each supplier and so the retention of title
clause ensures that the antique chairs continue to belong to the person who
supplied them. 3
If this identification is no longer possible after the mixing then it is necessary
to move to the second level of analysis. As an example of a situation where this
will be necessary consider the case of a purchaser of grain who buys grain from
two separate suppliers each of whom includes a simple retention of title clause
in the contract of sale. If the purchaser then stores all of the grain in the same
storage silo it will not be possible to identify positively which supplier supplied
each individual grain and as such each of the suppliers is precluded from
recovering its share of the grain without potentially converting grain belonging
to the other supplier.
(a) Roman Law: Confusio and Commixtio
The rules which the law developed to deal with this circumstance have their
incunabula in Roman law where an unfortunate distinction was drawn between
3 Smith v. Torr (1862) 3 F. & F. 505; 176 E.R. 227.
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fluid mixtures and mixtures of goods of an arid nature. 4 In the case of fluid
mixtures the doctrine which applied was known as the doctrine of confusio,
whereas where the goods mixed were of an arid character the doctrine of
commixtio applied. The distinction was drawn on the basis that liquids were
inseparable once mixed, but arid goods could be separated since each particle
retains its physical integrity despite the mixing.
However, as Professor Birks has persuasively argued, the distinction really is
illusory.5 In a case falling within the doctrine of confusio it was thought that,
given the inseparability of the mixed goods, there had to be co-ownership of
the resultant mass. 6 On the other hand, where a case of commixtio occurred the
goods were separable. Therefore, it was thought, they could each be returned to
their original and rightful owners and so continued ownership was considered
appropriate. But the distinction between confusio and commixtio does not help
the analysis at all. The real issue is not the separability of the goods but rather
whether it is possible to identify to whom each belongs. As Professor Birks has
explained:
"The Roman attempt to relate the legal results to the objective
physical realities within the mixture can be rejected. It can be
criticised from the standpoint of modem physics, and, given the
evidential impossibility of returning even a commixtio of, say,
unmarked sheep literally to the status quo so that each owner has
exactly the sheep he started with, it can be condemned as creating
differences which do not reflect material factual distinctions.'>7
(b) Common Law
At certain stages in the development of the common law in England this
unfortunate distinction was nevertheless considered useful. In Co/will v.
Reeves, Lord Ellenborough C.J. applied the concept of commixtio to furniture,
stating that:
4Birks, "Mixing and Tracing: Property and Restitution" (1992) 45 eLP. 69, at 71-78.
S Ibid, at 75-83.
6 Thomas, Textbook of Roman Law (North-Holland Publishing Company, 1976) at 169;
and Lee, The Elements of Roman Law (4th.ed., Sweet & Maxwell, 1956) at 133-134.
7 Birks, "Mixtures" in Palmer & McKendrick (eds.) Interests in Goods (1993) at 449,
458.
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"If a man puts com into my bag, in which there is before some
com, the whole is mine; because it is impossible to distinguish
what was mine from what was his. But it is impossible that articles
of furniture can be blended together so as to create the same
difficulty. The goods in question remained distinct .... "8
As has just been mentioned, it is misleading to equate separability with
identifiability. To return to an example used earlier, if moulded plastic chairs
supplied by one party are placed beside antique chairs supplied by another it is
still possible to determine which of each of the two suppliers owns each
particular chair but this is not simply because the chairs are separable and it is
defmitely not, as Lord Ellenborough suggested, because the chairs are furniture
rather than some other species of goods. It is because it is possible to identify
with certainty which chairs were supplied by each supplier. If that process of
identification were not possible, for example if moulded chairs were mixed
with identical moulded chairs from another source, the fact that they are
separable items is irrelevant. The problem still lies in identifying which chairs
belong to each supplier.
Happily, as the common law developed in England it appears to have
recognised the difficulties inherent in applying the distinction between cases of
confusio and commixtio. In its stead the common law adopted the concept of a
distinction between mixing which occurred by tortious misconduct and mixing
which was accidental or consensual. In Buckley v. Gross there was an
accidental mixing of tallow from two sources due to its melting in the heat of a
fire. Blackburn J. stated that:
"Probably the legal effect of such a mixture would be to make the
owners tenants in common in equal portions of the mass, but at all
events they do not lose their property in it." 9
In Spence v. Union Marine Insurance Co. Ltd. the identifying markings on
several (arid) bales of cotton were accidentally obliterated when the ship
transporting them to Liverpool was wrecked at sea. Bovill C.J. held:
8 (1811) 2 Camp. 575; 170 E.R. 1257 at 576; 1257; see also Smith v. Torr supra. n.3 at
506,227.
9 (1863) 3 B. & S. 566; 122 E.R. 213 at 576; 216.
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"We need not discuss the distinction sometimes made between
commixtio and confusio, apparently upon the ground that it is
possible to separate the individual solid particles, but not the
liquid; because in cases like the present, it is impracticable, and for
all business purposes therefore impossible, to distinguish the
particles, in respect of ownership."
Having thus recognised the practical impossibility of determining who owned
each of the remaining bales by reference to original ownership, he held that the
several contributors to the mass of bales co-owned the bales in shares based
proportionately on the number of bales which each had originally supplied:
"The goods being before they are mixed the separate property of
the several owners, unless, which is absurd, they cease to be
property by reason of accidental mixture, when they would not so
cease if the mixture were designed, must continue to be the
property of the original owners; and, as there would be no means
of distinguishing the goods of each, the several owners seem
necessarily to become jointly interested, as tenants in common, in
the bulk."lo
Where the mixing was not accidental nor by consent the common law held
that full ownership vested in the innocent party. For example, in Warde v . .£yre
Coke C.J. stated that:
"[I]f1. S. have a heape of com [sic], and I. D. will intermingle his
come with the come of 1. S. he shall here have all the come,
because this was so done by 1.D. of his own wrong." II
However, Staughton 1. recently had cause to reconsider this 'penal' rule in
10 (1868) L.R. 3 C.P. 427 at 438; see also Re Stapylton Fletcher Ltd; Re Ellis, Son &
Vidler Ltd [1994] 1W.L.R. 1181 at 1198.
11 (1614) 2 Buist. 323; 80 E.R. 1157 at 323; 1157; see also Lupton v. White (1808) 15
Yes. 432; [1802-13] All E.R Rep. 356, and Spence v. UnionMarine Insurance Co. Ltd. supra.
n.IO at 437-438, and Sandeman & Sons v. TyzackandBranfoot Steamship Co. Ltd. [1913] A.C.
680 at 694-695.
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The Ypatianna.12 The defendant was to transport crude oil for the plaintiff on
board the vessel The Ypatianna. Absent the consent of the plaintiff, the
defendant mixed the plaintiff s oil with oil of its own which was already in the
tanks of The Ypatianna. The plaintiff relied on Warde v. /Eyre to argue that
since there was no consent to the mixing the whole of the cargo must belong to
it. Staughton 1. refused to come to this conclusion. He explained that the penal
rule had been somewhat ameliorated by the concession made by the courts that
the wrongdoer would be entitled to have his property returned if he could prove
to the satisfaction of the court that a particular part of the mass belonged to him
and not the innocent party. 13 The penal rule therefore did not need to be applied
in its fullest strictures and, in light of the fact that none of the authorities were
binding on him, Staughton 1. held the rule he considered most appropriate to
be:
"Where B wrongfully mixes the goods of A with goods of his own,
which are substantially of the same nature and quality, and they
cannot in practice be separated, the mixture is held in common and
A is entitled to receive out of it a quantity equal to that of his
goods which went into the mixture, any doubt as to that quantity
being resolved in favour of A. He is also entitled to claim damages
from B in respect of any loss he may have suffered, in respect of
quality or otherwise, by reason of the admixture.
Whether the same rule would apply when the goods of A and B are
not substantially of the same nature and quality must be left to
another case." 14
Thus, where it is possible to calculate the contributions of the parties these will
prevail and there will be a tenancy in common in the proportions of those
contributions.
It is therefore no longer necessary to consider whether a particular mixing
occurred by accident, by consent or by a tortious act. This approach received
12 Indian Oil Corp. Ltd. v. Greenstone Shipping S.A. (Panama) (The Ypatianna) [1988]
I Q.B. 345.
13Lupton v. White, supra.n.II; cf, Armory v. Delamirie (1722) I Str. 505; 93 E.R. 664.
14 Indian Oil Corp. Ltd. v. Greenstone Shipping S.A. (panama) ([he Ypatianna) supra.
n.12 at 370-371.
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the imprimatur of the Court of Appeal of New Zealand in Coleman v. Harvey
where Cooke P. quoted from Staughton J.'sjudgment in The Ypatianna and
concluded that the same principle should apply to consensual mixing. 15
The common law has thus reached the position where the commingling of
goods of the same species will give rise to a tenancy in common of the resultant
mixture with each of the contributors sharing ownership in proportion to their
respective contributions. This is so whether the goods mixed are of an arid or
fluid nature and the reason for the mixing is only relevant insofar as a tortfeasor
cannot benefit from its own wrongdoing. This conclusion has recently been
approved by the House of Lords inMercer v. Craven Grain Storage Ltd. 16 All
five of the Law Lords were of the opinion that the commixtio of grain from
several sources had the result that "title must have remained in the growers
from time to time interested in the mix in proportion to their respective
tonnages" and this conclusion was so clear that citation of authority was
unnecessary. 17
Similarly, in New Zealand the Court of Appeal adopted this approach in
Good v. Bruce. IS In that case butter-fat from various different suppliers had
been placed in bulk storage by a co-operative dairy company in such a way that
the identity of each supplier's property was lost. The Court of Appeal held the
mass was co-owned by the contributing suppliers. The more recent case of
Ahead Group Ltd. (in rec) v. Downer Mining Ltd. in the High Court of New
Zealand is also instructive in this regard. 19 Here, crushed metal was supplied to
be used to cover the purchaser's timber yard. The metal was supplied subject to
a simple retention of title clause and was delivered whereupon it was
compacted into the surface of the yard. The purchaser was unable to pay for the
IS [1989] 1 N.Z.L.R. 723 at 726-727 per Cooke P.
16 Unreported, House of Lords, 17th. March, 1994, Lords Templeman, Goff, Browne-
Wilkinson, Mustill and Lloyd.
17 Ibid., per Lord Templeman (Lords Browne-Wilkinson and Mustill concumng); see also
per Lord Lloyd (Lord Goff concurring) and the decision of the Court of Appeal, unreported, 12th.
February, 1993, Russell L.J. and Simon Brown L.J.
18 [1917] N.Z.L.R. 514 at 521 (per Edwards J.) and 535 (per Stout C.1. and Cooper 1.);
cf, at 541, 543, 546-547 (per Denniston J. and Chapman 1. dissentient).
19 Unreported, High Court of New Zealand, Auckland; 26th. August, 1991, c.P. 1304/91
per Wylie 1.
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metal and so the supplier attempted to recover possession. On hearing an
application for an interlocutory injunction to prevent the supplier from so
doing, Wylie J. held that the injunction ought to be granted as there was an
arguable case that:
"[T]here has been such a degree of mixing that no removal of
consequence could safely be effected without there being a risk of
removal of the plaintiff's property. !fthat be the case there is an
intermixture of property of two persons resulting, as I see it, in the
loss of the sole right of ownership reserved by the Romalpa clause
to the defendant and in its place substituting an ownership in
common according to the respective contributions of the plaintiff
and the defendant.'>2O
An interesting point deserves mention before consideration is given to the
other two scenarios mentioned earlier. That is that whilst the common law is
prepared to accept that co-ownership results where goods are commingled and
thereby lose their identifiability, the common law nevertheless refuses to accept
that a mixture of monies ought to be co-owned. The rules of tracing are
currently set against such a conclusion. 21It is neither possible nor necessary to
reconsider that topic in this article but it is suggested that insofar as there is an
inconsistency with the analysis above it is the rules of tracing which are
theoretically flawed and which require reconsideration rather than the concepts
just discussed. 22
As will probably be clear from the last comment there is no quarrel with the
legal principles which have been developed in response to the question of
ownership of a mixture of homogeneous goods. They have been traversed here
because they provide an important and useful background to the suggestions
which will be made in respect of mixtures of heterogeneous goods.
20 Ibid. at 7-8 citing Smurthwaite v. Hannay [1894] A.c. 494 and Sandeman & Sons v.
Tyzack and Branfoot Steamship Co. Ltd. supra.n.11. It bears noting here that the case ought
perhaps have been decided pursuant to the principles applicable to fixtures but this does not
appear to have been argued.
21 Birks, supra.n.4 at 79-81.
22 Cf, Cooke, "Review and Notices" (1992) 108L.Q.R. 334 at 337.
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MIXING GOODS OF DIFFERING SPECIES TO PRODUCE A NEW
PRODUCT
The position which has been just been discussed is only applicable where
goods of the same species have been commingled. In such a situation the goods
lose their identifiability in the sense that it is no longer possible to identify who
supplied them, but the common law has always considered this to be very
different to the situation where raw goods are mixed with goods of another
species to produce a completely new species of goods or where goods are
worked such that they become a completely new species of goods.
(a) Existing Law
The common law has always maintained, and again it draws on Roman law
here, that where a new species of goods has been created those goods belong to
the manufacturer. 23 In Thorogood v. Robinson a quantity of lime was produced
by the plaintiff by burning chalk which he had dug from the defendant's land.
Holt C.J. held that the chalk which had been dug up:
"[H]ad been converted into an article of a different species; and,
when a person makes wine, oil or bread out of another's grapes,
olives or wheat, it belongs to the new operator, who is only to
make satisfaction to the former proprietor for the materials which
he has so converted." 24
More recently, in Clough Mill Ltd. v. Martin Robert GoffL.J. stated the law as
follows:
"[Ilt is no doubt true that, where A's material is lawfully used by B
to create new goods, whether or not B incorporates other material
of his own, the property in the new goods will generally vest in B,
at least where the goods are not reducible to the original
23 See, e.g., Thomas at 174-176 and Lee at 134-135 & 142-143, supra.n.6.
24 (1845) 6 Q.B. 769; 115 E.R. 290 at 771; 290-291; see also Blackstone, Commentaries
on the Laws of England, 15th ed., by Christian (1809) Book II, 404.
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materials."2S
The central reason for this approach flows from the fact that the original goods
have disappeared, whether by combination or reaction with other goods or by
being worked so as to create an entirely new species. As such, even although
the supplier has included a simple retention of title clause it is not possible to
identify the original goods within the new product. As Bridge L.J. put it in
Borden (U.K) Ltd. v. Scottish Timber Products Ltd. :
"[T]he doctrine expounded by Sir George Jessel M.R. [in Re
Hallett's Estate 26]contemplates the tracing of goods into money
and money into goods ... It is at the heart of [the] argument [for the
supplier] that the same applies to a mixture of goods with goods ....
Now I can well see the force of that argument if the goods mixed
are all of a homogenous character .... But a mixture of
heterogeneous goods in a manufacturing process wherein the
original goods lose their character and what emerges is a wholly
new product, is in my judgment something entirely different."27
The right to trace goods is traditionally thought to depend upon the continued
existence of the goods being traced and so the disappearance of the supplier's
raw goods is thought to prevent it from tracing into the newly created product. 28
As further support for the legal conclusion that ownership in the new product
vests in the manufacturer it is also often pointed out that this avoids a windfall
being conferred upon the supplier who, after all, only retained title to the
original raw goods. Since the supplier could have taken rights in the product
but has chosen not to do so, such rights will not be beneficently conferred. 29
2S [1985] 1 W.L.R. III at 119; see also Borden (U.K.) Ltd. v. Scottish Timber Products
Ltd. [1981] 1 Ch. 25, and International Banking Corp. v. Ferguson Shaw & Sons 1910 S.C. 182.
26 (1880) 13 Ch. D. 696,708-711.
27 Supra.n.25 at 41.
28 Re Diplock; Diplock v. Wintle [1948] 1 Ch. 465 at 521; see also Re Goldcorp
Exchange Ltd. (in receivership): Kensington v. Liggett [1994] 3 N.z.L.R. 385 at 408, and Goode,
"Ownership and Obligation in Commercial Transactions" (1987) 103 L.Q.R. 433 'at 446.
29 Borden (UK) Ltd. v. Scottish Timber Products Ltd. supra.n.25 at 42.
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Another reason which is frequently called in aid is the belief that use of the raw
goods in a manufacturing process must in and of itself involve a transfer of title
to the manufacturer because it would be inconsistent for title to remain with the
supplier whilst the manufacturer has the right to consume those goods in a
manufacturing process. 30 Finally, at an evidential level, courts are quick to
point to the fact that if the newly created product were to be comprised of
goods from several suppliers it would be necessary to quantify the proportions
of the product to which each supplier would be entitled. Such an enquiry
would, it is said, require the courts to unearth the unearthable, trace the
untraceable and calculate the incalculable.31
(b) Problems
Despite the arguments which are advanced in support of the orthodox
position it is not without problems.
(1) Drawing distinctions
For example, it has just been seen that the law currently distinguishes
between cases where goods of the same species have been mixed and cases
where goods of distinct species are combined to produce a new species of
goods. It is therefore fundamental, particularly given the commercial setting
within which these doctrines inevitably operate, that it be possible to determine
under which doctrine a particular case will fall - for a supplier the distinction
can mean the difference between a co-ownership interest in mixed goods or no
interest whatsoever in a newly created product. Yet the line is not clear.
Of course, there are cases that clearly fall either side of the line. A mixture of
grain with grain of a similar quality will clearly result in a co-ownership
interest, and mixing resin with woodchips to produce chipboard will, under the
current law, mean the supplier loses its security interest. But in other cases it is
not so clear which doctrine is applicable. Several tests have been experimented
with at various times in an attempt to differentiate the two situations. It appears
to be readily accepted that a refashioning of the raw goods does not necessarily
alter their identity and if such is the case the rule for newly created products
30 See, e.g., Borden (U.K.) Ltd. v. Scottish Timber Products Ltd. ibid at 41, and Re Bond
Worth Ltd. [1980] Ch. 228 at 266, and South Australian Insurance Co. v. Randell (1869) L.R.
3 P.C. 10 1 at 107-108, and Muir, "Recent Developments in 'ReselVation of Property' Clauses"
(1985) 13 A.B.L.R. 3 at 24.
31 Borden (U.K.) Ltd. v. Scottish Timber Products Ltd. supra.n.25 at 44 per Templeman
L.J., and 42 per Bridge L.J.
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cannot be applied. 32 Thus in Pongakawa Sawmill Ltd. v. New Zealand Forest
Products Ltd. the Court of Appeal of New Zealand accepted that logs which
had been processed into sawn timber (with by-products of bark, chips and
sawdust) were still essentially the same "goods" and as such were still liable to
be re-possessed by the supplier under its retention of title clause. 33 There had
been no alteration in the fundamental character of the goods and hence title
could not be argued, under the orthodox position, to have passed to the
manufacturer. Richardson 1. stated that:
"If notwithstanding any permitted work the goods retain their
original character and so continue to answer the description 'the
goods', in which case the property in the goods does not pass from
seller to buyer until those conditions are fulfilled, s.21 [of the Sale
of Goods Act 1908 (NZ)] authorises the reservation of a right of
disposal. .... Whether goods worked on retain their identity must
depend on the nature and extent of the work permitted to be done
ahd actually done .... Importantly the processing simply modified
the form of the logs which as sawn timber retained its essential
character." 34
The court found support for its view in the similarity of the case to Armour v.
Thyssen Edelstahlwerke A.G. where steel was supplied and part of it had been
cut into sheets. 35 The House of Lords there held that title had not thereby
passed as the steel was still essentially in the same form as that in which it was
supplied.
However, neither of these cases provide much guidance as to exactly when a
"refashioning" ends and a "change of substance" begins. It has been suggested
32 Bell,Modern Law of Personal Property in England and Ireland (Butterworth, 1989)
at 70.
33 [1992] 3 N.Z.L.R. 304.
34 Ibid. at 309; see also at 308, and New Zealand Forest Products Ltd. v. Pongakawa
Sawmill Ltd. [1991]3 N.z.L.R. 112 at 115, andAnonymous (1560) Moo. K.B. 18; 72 E.R. 411.
35 [1991] 2 A.C. 339.
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that the nature of the work done will be important, 36but of itself this does not
advance the pursuit of a clear or commercially practicable test very far at all. In
Borden the point at which the change occurs was held to be "as soon as the
resin was used in the manufacturing process" 37and in reliance upon this
counsel for the purchaser in Pongakawa 38argued that title to the raw goods
passed to the purchaser as soon as processing began. The approach of the court
in Pongakawa recognises that at anyone point in time the constituent parts of a
product may not have changed so fundamentally as to have disappeared, but
may still have begun to be used in the manufacturing process.39
Other tests are available. Alternative tests include ascertaining whether the
product is a substance which is chemically different from the previous one, and
the test of reversibility as it was developed by the Justinian school of Roman
jurisprudence,4O which was applied in International Banking Corp. v. Ferguson
Shaw & Sons.41 However, as MattheWs has shown, both the chemical change
test and the reversibility test are defective. 42This really only leaves the
substance test43which is difficult to apply in a practical setting as it is subject to
several, often incompatible, factors.44
(2) Using goods in manufacturing processes
As mentioned earlier, one of the reasons often advanced in support of the
orthodox legal position in this area is the belief that it is inconsistent with the
supplier's continued ownership that the purchaser be permitted to use the
36ModelboardLtd. v. Outer Box Ltd. [1992] B.C.C. 945 at 953, and Pongakawa Sawmill
Ltd. v. New Zealand Forest Products Ltd. supra.n.33 at 309.
37 Borden (UK) Ltd. v. Scottish Timber Products Ltd. supra.n.25 at 35.
38 Pongakawa Sawmill Ltd. v. New Zealand Forest Products Ltd. supra.n.33.
39 Cj, Re Bond Worth Ltd. supra.n.30 at 237.
40 See Whittaker, "Retention of Title and Specification" (1984) 100 L.Q.R. 35 at 40, and
Lee, supra.n.6 at 134-135.
41 Supra.n.25.
42 Matthews, '''Specificatio' in the Common Law" (1981) 10Anglo-Am. L.R 121 at 123-
124.
43 Ibid. at 125-126.
44 Hicks, "When goods sold become a new species" [1993] JB.L. 485 at 488-490.
36
"RETAINING" TITLE ..
supplied goods in a manufacturing process. This is simply not so, as the Court
of Appeal of New Zealand has recently accepted:
"[I]n principle to allow the buyer to work on and use goods is not
necessarily inconsistent with an intention that title shall not
immediately pass to the buyer."4s
Moreover, the argument really misses the point in this context as it focuses too
heavily upon retention of title to the original goods rather than upon the issue
of ownership of the new product. Argument about when (or whether) title to the
original goods was lost is relevant but it does not assist terribly much in
deciding who has title to the newly created goods.
(c) A New Approach
(1) The inability to trace
As mentioned above, the orthodoxy holds that title to a product newly created
from goods supplied subject to a simple retention of title clause vests in the
creator of that product as the supplier's original goods have disappeared and so
cannot be traced. Obviously enough, there are two steps in this argument and in
order to be clear each will be discussed in tum.
The first step is that title to the original goods has disappeared once they have
been consumed in the manufacturing process. Parris has argued that this is not
the case but in support of his argument he cites cases which dealt with the
commingling of homogeneous rather than heterogeneous goods. 46It seems
patent that once a new species has been created title to its original constituent
parts must surely have disappeared 47- the resin cannot even be separated from
the chipboard, let alone retain an independent title! This was conceded by
counsel in Borden but Bridge L.J. made it very clear that he thought no other
position tenable:
"[T]here is no doubt that as soon as the resin was used in the
manufacturing process it ceased to exist as resin, and accordingly
4S Pongakawa Sawmill Ltd. v. New Zealand Forest Products 30 Ltd. supra.n.33 at 309.
46 Parris, Effective Retention of Title Clauses (Collins, 1986) at 88, quoting from Buckley
v. Gross supra.n.9 at 576; 216.
47 Borden (U.K) Ltd. v. Scottish Timber Products Ltd. [1979] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 168 at 170.
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title to the resin simply disappeared. So much is conceded by
[counsel] for the [supplier]." 48
As such the newly created product must have a new title of its own. But this
step does not necessarily validate the second level of the orthodox argument,
which relies upon the traditional understanding that it is not possible to trace
goods once they have disappeared. In so doing the orthodox theory relies upon
a misunderstanding of what, it is suggested, is the true conceptual nature of
tracing.
Professor Birks has recently pointed out that the concept of tracing does not
solely concern the following of things. Instead, he suggests, it involves the
following of the value of things:
"Time and again we fall into the habit of speaking as though what
is traced is a thing. We talk of tracing money or tracing property.
But that must be wrong. There is no question of the physical thing
surviving in the substitute. The very notion of substitution
excludes that. The £1,000 is not in the watercolour [for which it
was hypothetically substituted]. We should try to think of tracing
value, not things .... Tracing is no more than the means of finding
out where at any relevant moment value is located."49
Whilst it is agreed that it is clearly incorrect to conceive tracing as merely
involving the following of things it is respectfully suggested, that instead of
understanding tracing as the following of value it is better to conceive of it as
the following of rights. For example, a beneficiary under a trust has an
equitable interest in the trust property and can trace that interest into other
property which the trustee may (properly or otherwise) substitute for the trust
property. The beneficiary traces his or her rights to enjoy the benefits of the
trust property into the new property, and thereby obtains an equitable
ownership interest in the newly obtained property. That equitable ownership
interest gives the beneficiary the right to enjoy any value which that property
may possess or attain. Thus, by tracing his or her rights in the original trust
property the beneficiary has, as Birks suggests, in effect traced the value of that
48 Borden (U.K) Ltd. v. Scottish Timber Products Ltd. supra.n.25 at 35.
49 Birks, supra.n.4 at 85-86.
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property into the new property. However, whilst it may perhaps be a purely
semantic point, it seems to me to provide for a better conceptual understanding
of tracing to speak of following rights in or to things rather than merely the
value of those things. The value of property can be adequately represented by a
mere charge over the new property which the trustee acquires, but if one thinks
of tracing as following the beneficiary's rights in the original trust property into
the new property one can fully explain why an equitable ownership interest,
rather than merely a charge, can be claimed.
Once this conception of tracing is accepted it is no longer impossible to trace
goods which have disappeared in specie because it is still theoretically possible
to trace the rights which used to exist in those goods. Even if one does not
accept the understanding of tracing which I have suggested and one opts
instead for Birks' conception of tracing value, the value of the lost goods can
still be traced into the newly created product. As Birks puts it, "value has the
capacity to survive independently of both form and substance",So
Therefore, in terms of the question of a supplier's interest in goods newly
created from raw goods which it has supplied subject to a simple retention of
title clause, it can be argued that the supplier has the ability to trace its retained
ownership rights into the newly created product. In advancing his theory of
tracing Birks made this tentative suggestion:
"The specificatio consumes the resin, but not its value now
inhering in the new product. The law as declared by the Court of
Appeal appears to deny me any entitlement in the chipboard, for in
Borden (UK) Ltd. v. Scottish Timber Products Ltd. the court
thought it impossible to trace beyond the point at which the raw
material ceased to exist in the new product. But can that be right?
We are talking about a right which depends on the tracing of
value, not on tracing things."sl
Although he did not outline his reasoning, Judge Rubin arrived at a similar
decision at the trial court level in Borden, holding that "there is no reason why
the tracing remedy should not extend both to the chipboard and its proceeds of
50 Ibid. at 98.
51 Ibid. at 98.
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sale". 52
A second point about the principles of tracing must be mentioned here as it is
crucial to the development of a principled theory in the area of newly
manufactured products. The point concerns the difference between the ability
to trace rights at common law and in equity. Traditionally these jurisdictions
have developed separately and as such they have evolved differing pre-
requisites for the application of their tracing principles. The difference was
based on the arbitrary difference between whether a plaintiff held common law
title to goods or merely had an equitable (beneficial) interest in the property
concerned. Where the former was the case the process of tracing was unable to
see beyond clear substitutions 53 so that where the goods to be traced became
mixed with other goods tracing was considered impossible. So far as equity
was concerned this position was impractical and caused injustice and so equity
developed rules which provided (artificial) methods for determining whether,
and to what extent, the rights of one or other contributor were still subsisting in
the mixture or had been dissipated. 54
A retention of title clause ensures retention of full and absolute ownership to
the goods until payment is received. This is common law ownership and as
such is theoretically subject to the common law rules as to tracing. These rules
would seem to baulk at the idea of being able to trace into a mixture, let alone
being able to trace into a mixture where the goods themselves cannot be
recognised as subsisting in their original form.
It is only possible to sketch the general direction of a response to this problem
here. It is believed that the answer to the problem lies in the notion that law
and equity have become substantively fused in certain areas. 55 This fusion has
occurred by way of an intermingling of law and equity over time with a
52 Borden (UK) Ltd. v. Scottish Timber Products Ltd. supra.n.4 7 at 171.
53 Taylor v. Plumer (1815) 3 M. & S. 562; ISO E.R. 721, and Banque Beige Pour
L 'Etranger v. Hambrouck [1912] 1 KB. 321.
54 See, e.g., Re Diplock; Diplock v. Wintle supra.n.28; Re Gatway; Hertslet v. Gatway
[1903] 2 Ch. 356; James Roscoe (Bolton) Ltd. v. Winder [1915] 1 Ch. 62; Clayton's Case (1817)
1 Mer. 572; 35 E.R. 781.
55 See Maxton, New lealand Law Society Seminar: Equity Update (1993) at 1-13, and
Maxton, "Some Effects of the Intermingling of Law and Equity" 5 Canta. L.R. 299.
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measure of cross-fertilisation between the two as each developed. 56Whilst it is
clear that the rules of tracing have not yet clearly 'fused,' 57it is suggested that
such fusion is long overdue. It is believed that this assertion can be justified if
one considers the difference in potency between tracing at law and tracing in
equity, a difference which cannot be logically sustained. A person who has full
and absolute (and hence legal) ownership of goods has, as one of the bundle of
rights which such a position entails, the right to split the legal from the
equitable ownership, thereby creating a trust. It is absurd that where the legal
owner of goods has not created an equitable interest therein he or she may not
trace his or her rights in the goods into a mixture, but the beneficial owner of
the goods would be able to do so if a trust had been created over the goods.
There seems no good reason for saying that the techniques of tracing which
have been developed in the equitable jurisdiction should not also be employed
in the legal jurisdiction now that the two jurisdictions have begun to fuse
substantively.
It ought to be mentioned that this argument is based on common sense and
the fact that there is no logical reason, other than the accidents of history, to
maintain the separation between the principles of tracing at law and in equity.
But this argument is not based on any idea of there being a putative equitable
interest in all absolute legal interests. As Professor Goode has pointed out:
"Where legal and beneficial ownership are in the same person
there is no separate equitable interest, for the existence of such an
interest depends on a division between management and
enjoyment."58
(2) Co-ownership
If the supplier can trace the rights which it retained in the supplied goods into
the newly created product what does this mean for ownership of the product?
The rights which are traced are proprietary and therefore ought to be recognised
56 Maxton, New Zealand Law Society Seminar: Equity Update (1993) at 3.
57 Ibid. at 11.
58 Goode, Commercial Law (2nd.ed. Penguin, 1995) at 59; see also Commissioner of
Stamp Duties v. Livingston [1965] AC. 694 at 712, and Gray, "Equitable Property" (1995) 48
CLP. 157 at 162-166; cf, Oakley, "The Prerequisites of an Equitable Tracing Claim" (1975)
28 CLP. 64 at 73 et seq.
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in some fonn of proprietary interest in the product. However, that does not
establish exactly what fonn of proprietary interest should be recognised. There
are two likely candidates. First, the supplier could be recognised as having a
charge over the product to the value of the goods which were absorbed into the
creation thereof. Alternatively the supplier could obtain co-ownership of the
newly created product.
If one takes the line, which is suggested, that the nature of tracing is to follow
rights, then it becomes fairly obvious that the latter is the more appropriate
proprietary interest to recognise. The rights of ownership include the right to
enjoy the benefit of property and this entails the right to benefit if the market
value of the property increases along with the concomitant 'right' to suffer if
the market value drops. As such, if the supplier traces its rights in the raw
goods into the product then, on this rights-based conception of tracing, an
ownership interest must arise. A charge is for a static value and as such cannot
fully reflect the rights which the supplier retained in the raw goods and has
traced into the newly manufactured product. A co-ownership interest in the
product ensures that the ownership rights which are traced are properly
reflected in the supplier's proprietary interest in the product.
Alternatively, if one takes Birks' line and follows value rather than rights
then the enquiry becomes slightly more complex, and it is suggested,
needlessly so. The difficulty lies in the fact that if it is only the value of the
supplier's raw goods which are traced into the newly created product, then
arguably this can be adequately represented merely by a charge. However, it is
still possible to conclude that a fonn of co-ownership is in fact the preferable
proprietary option if one argues that the ownership of a chattel entails a bundle
of rights and the value of the chattel is simply the conglomeration of those
rights. Then, on Birks' conception of tracing, to trace the raw goods into the
newly manufactured product will involve tracing the rights which constitute the
value of the raw goods supplied. As such, albeit by a more tortuous route, one
reaches the same conclusion: the more appropriate of the two possible
proprietary interests is co-ownership between the supplier and the creator.
As mentioned earlier, the understanding of tracing as following of rights is to
be preferred because it avoids the need for such argument and gets straight to
the heart of the matter, thereby more properly reflecting the true conceptual
nature of tracing. It is, of course, true that rights are valuable and therefore have
value, but it is better to understand that it is the rights in the raw goods which
are being followed rather than merely the value of the goods themselves. In
quantifying those rights resort will obviously have to be had to the value of the
42
"RETAINING" TITLE ..
rights, but a singular reference to the monetary value of the goods being traced
may fail to fully explain the results of tracing because it loses sight of the
nature of the rights which are being followed.
In the end therefore, whichever approach is taken, the result is the same: the
newly created product is a chattel and, as with the raw goods, a bundle of rights
attaches thereto. The question which the law must answer is, which of the rights
is to be bestowed upon the supplier and which upon the creator? If the supplier
is able to trace his rights in the raw goods into the product then co-ownership is
the most appropriate form of proprietary interest for the supplier to receive. A
charge over the products is merely security for a certain value and does not
entail the rights that ownership does so it would not provide the supplier with
full recognition of the rights which it preserved using the simple retention of
title clause.
However, if co-ownership of the product is to be the method used to give vent
to the rights which the supplier has traced, then it is also necessary to decide
upon what basis the co-ownership shall exist. One possibility would be a co-
ownership of the product between the supplier and the creator on the basis that
the supplier owns the product to the value of the goods which it supplied.
However, this looks suspiciously like a charge. In order to remain true to the
reasoning which supports co-ownership it must be ownership of a proportion of
the product.
In order to discuss the method by which the proportions of ownership would
be calculated it is useful to start with a basic model of the value of the product.
Creation of the product will have involved both the costs of the raw goods
which have been consumed and of the labour required for the manufacture. The
market price of the product is, of course, set externally from the parties as a
matter of supply and demand. The difference between the market price and the
total production costs determines the profit which the manufacturer receives. It
is therefore possible to say that a proportion of the market price S9 of the product
represents the raw materials, another proportion reflects the labour and the
remaining proportion is the profit of the creator. However, the simplicity of this
model belies the fact that the market price of a particular species of product will
fluctuate with time and it is entirely possible that such fluctuation will occur
between the time of the agreement to sell the raw goods and the time at which
S9 Birks, supra.n.7 at 457: "proportions are to be determined by value", and at 466-467;
Gill & Duffus (Liverpool) Ltd. v. Scruttons Ltd. [1953] 1 w.L.R. 1407 at 1415; Sandeman &
Sons v. Tyzack and Branfoot Steamship Co Ltd. supra.n.II at 700-701.
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the product is created. If, for example, the market price of the particular product
increases during that time span, then the size of the proportion of the product
which represents the raw goods used will also be correlatively increased. In
such a circumstance the supplier of the raw goods would appear to receive a
windfall in that it now owns goods with a value higher than it agreed to sell the
raw goods for. This, however, is no real surprise when one considers the basic
principles of retention of title.
It is useful here to step back for a moment from the question of ownership of
newly created products and consider the basic situation under an agreement to
sell goods entered into subject to a simple retention of title clause where the
goods remain identifiable and the price of the goods is not paid. Pursuant to the
clause the 'supplier has retained title to the goods and is entitled to their return if
the price is not paid. However, the supplier has also entered into an agreement
to sell the goods and so it cannot simply retake possession of the goods
whenever it chooses. The right to repossess only arises if and when the
purchaser repudiates the agreement to sell and the supplier accepts that
repudiation. Typically a sale of goods subject to a retention of title clause will
allow the purchaser a period of credit. If the price remains unpaid after this
period has elapsed the purchaser will have repudiated the contract and the
supplier can accept the repudiation by retaking (or demanding) possession of
the goods. But if, between the date of the initial agreement and the date of
repudiation, the market price for the goods has increased to a level where the
current market value of the goods exceeds the price which the purchaser had
agreed to pay for them, it is necessary to decide whether the supplier must
account to the purchaser for that difference in value.
On this issue two views exist. The first was adequately expressed by Lord
Donaldson M.R. in Clough Mill Ltd. v. Martin:
"I am inclined to think that the word 'until' in the phrase 'reserves
the right to dispose of the material until payment in full for all the
material has been received' connotes not only a temporal, but also
a quantitative limitation. In other words, the [supplier] can go on
selling hank by hank until they have been paid in full, but if
thereafter they continue to sell, they are accountable to the
[purchaser] for having sold goods which, upon full payment
having been achieved, became the [purchaser's] goods.'>6O
60 Supra.n.25 at 126.
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Similarly, in the High Court of New Zealand Barker 1. has expressed the
opinion that:
"If there is a surplus, it could well be that, under the contract, it
belongs to the [purchaser] rather than to the [supplier]." 61
The second view was endorsed by Robert Goff L.J. in the Clough Mill case:
"[The supplier] can during the subsistence of the contract only
resell such amount of the material as is needed to discharge the
balance of the outstanding purchase price; and if he sells more he
is accountable to the buyer for the surplus. However, once the
contract has been detenn;ned, as it will be if the buyer repudiates
the contract and the seller accepts the repudiation, the seller will
have his rights as owner (including, of course, his right to sell the
goods) uninhibited by any contractual restrictions; though any part
of the purchase price received by him and attributable to the
material so resold will be recoverable by the buyer on the ground
of failure of consideration, subject to any set off arising from a
cross-claim by the plaintifffor damages for the buyer's
repudiation." 62
In the same case Oliver L.J. agreed, holding that after the purchaser has
repudiated and the supplier has repossessed the goods and sold them elsewhere:
"[H]e does so not as a mortgagee who must account to the
liquidator for any balance over and above the purchase price but as
the owner of goods in respect of which no further contractual
rights are exercisable by the buyer. If there is a shortfall, he may
prove in the liquidation for damages for breach of contract. But at
no stage after the acceptance of the buyer's repudiation is the
liquidator entitled to re-establish the contract and to defeat the
seller's proprietary right in the subject matter by tendering the
6\ Len Vidgen Ski & Leisure Ltd. v. Timaru Marine Supplies (1982) Ltd. [1986] 1
N.Z.L.R. 349 at 364.
62 Supra.n.25 at 118 (emphasis added).
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price." 63
With respect, the second view is the better as it gives proper recognition to
the fact that the supplier has retained title to the goods and has not merely taken
a charge over them. Holding title to goods involves a bundle of rights, the most
fundamental of which is the right to enjoy the benefit of the goods. As such,
when the supplier retains title to the goods he retains the right to enjoy any
increase in the market value of the goods. Further, to suggest that the supplier
is under some duty to account to the purchaser, as a mortgagee is to his or her
mortgagor, would import notions of a duty to sell the goods at a time when the
best price possible can be obtained. Such a duty would be wholly inconsistent
with the fact that the supplier has retained title to the goods and should
therefore in no way be under any obligations to the purchaser in respect of
those goods once the contract has come to an end. Thus, once the supplier has
accepted repudiation of the contract it is entitled to retain any profit which may
arise as a result of a resale of the goods concerned.
To return, therefore, to the context of the supplier's co-ownership interest in a
newly created product, the co-ownership of a proportion of that product has the
same effect. The apparent windfall, where fluctuations in the market value of
the product cause that proportion to be worth more than the price at which the
raw goods were to be sold, is entirely legitimate in that by retaining title the
supplier retained the right to enjoy full ownership rights and it is these rights
which are traced into the product. As it was put recently in Modelboard Ltd. v.
Outer Box Ltd.:
"It is true that in such a case as the present so to read the contract
leads to an odd result in that, on the happening of an event which
entitles the [supplier] to take possession of the products, the
[supplier] might find himself entitled to a windfall, if it exercised
that right, which it would deny itself if it simply permitted the
[purchaser] to sell the goods pursuant to its power of sale.
However, the possibility of the [supplier] enjoying such a windfall
could not exist unless the [purchaser's] right to complete the
contract by payment had been extinguished. The envisaged
situation is no odder than that which would obtain in relation to
unprocessed board should the market value of the unprocessed
63 Ibid. at 122 (emphasis added).
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board have risen in the meantime. '>64
It is also worth remembering that if the market value of the product decreases
instead of increasing over the same time span then the value ofthe supplier's
proportion of the product will drop below the price which initially was to be
paid and the supplier will be left to sue for the remainder as a personal debt
which will rank pari passu with all the other unsecured creditors in a
liquidation. The imposition of a charge over the product to the value of the
price of the raw goods would ensure that the supplier did not receive any
increase in the value of the product but it would also provide the supplier with
an unfair proportion of the value of the product in the event that the market
price for the product has dropped below the level it was at when the agreement
to sell the raw goods was first entered into.
Thus, it is suggested that the most "appropriate"form of proprietary interest
for the supplier to receive is co-ownership of the product in proportion to the
value of the product which is attributable to the raw goods supplied. 6S This also
leaves the creator of the goods with a co-ownership interest in the product
which would be calculated by reference to the proportion of the value of the
product which its labour represents. Initially it may seem unusual that labour
should manifest itself in a proprietary form - certainly Marx would be
surprised! - but it can be explained in at least two ways. First, the product is a
bundle of rights which the law must attempt to distribute. It is not illogical that
the labour responsible for the creation of those rights should justifiably lead to
receipt of some of those rights. Second, if the supplier is to trace its ownership
rights into the new product, the raw goods do not represent the whole of the
product and so the supplier ought not to receive ownership of the whole of the
product. It is eminently sensible that ownership of the product be shared
between the supplier and the creator in shares which reflect their respective
contributions to its creation.
There is some support for this position in the case law. The best example is
the decision of the Court of Appeal of New Zealand in Goodv. Bruce. 66 This
case concerned the production of butter and other dairy products from the
64 Supra.n.36 at 952-953.
65 See Aquaculture Corp. Y. New Zealand Green Mussel Co Ltd. [1990] 3 N.Z.L.R. 299
at 301, and Mouat Y. Clark Boyce [1992] 2 N.z.L.R. 559 at 566.
66 Goody. Bruce supra.n.18.
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butter-fat of numerous suppliers. The court held that title in the butter-fat was
not intended to pass to the co-operative dairy company immediately and that as
a result the company co-owned the resultant butter with the suppliers of the
butter-fat. 67 The reasoning of the court is, with respect, somewhat threadbare
and hence perhaps should not be relied upon without reference to the principles
discussed above. Professor Goode has also given his imprimatur to the
argument that where goods are mixed so as to create a new product the product
is co-owned.68 It is unfortunate, however, that in support of this proposition he
cites Farnsworth v. Federal Commissioner of Taxationwhich involved the
mixing of fruit but did not involve the creation of a new species of goods at
al1.69 Goode goes on to suggest that where the mixing involves no goods except
those of the supplier the creator of the product will own the product. 70 With
respect, it is difficult to understand why the creator should have full title to a
product arising from labour expended on someone else's goods, but it must
share ownership of the product where it incorporates goods of its own in the
manufacturing process. The better approach is, as has been suggested above,
one which guarantees co-ownership in both cases.
Hence, it is suggested that where goods are sold subject to a simple retention
of title clause and prior to payment they are mixed with goods of a different
species to produce a new product, the orthodox presumption that the creator
wholly owns that product should be abandoned in favour of a more equitable
presumption of co-ownership. The supplier, in effect, gains 'retained' title to
the new product. Like the orthodox presumption, this is of course able to be
altered by express or implied agreement between the parties.
(3) Advantages of the 'heterodox' approach
Aside from the fact that the approach which has just been suggested is based
more soundly in legal principle than the orthodox approach, it has added
practical value in that it avoids the necessity to draw the problematic distinction
between the creation of a new product and mixing of goods of the same species.
67 Ibid. at 521 (per Edwards 1.), and 535 (per Stout c.J. and Cooper J.); cl, 541, 543,
546-547 (per Denniston and Chapman n. dissentient).
68 Goode, Proprietary Rights and Insolvency in Sales Transactions (2nd.ed., Sweet &
Maxwell, 1989) at 92.
69 (1948) 78 c.L.R. 504.
70 Goode, supra.n.68.
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If the heterodox presumption of co-ownership is applied then there will be co-
ownership of a newly created product just as there is co-ownership where
goods are mixed without losing their identity as a species. Whilst the Court of
Appeal did not express the matter in quite this way, this can be seen from an
examination of Coleman v. Harvey. 71 Briefly, the facts of this case were that
Harvey supplied silver coins to Coleman to be refined, along with other source
material belonging to Coleman, into ingots. Harvey was to have the right to 166
kilograms of the fine silver which it was expected would be produced, and
Coleman was to retain the excess. The refinement process was completed but
Coleman disposed of the resulting ingots in the ordinary course of business and
so Harvey sued in conversion. It is very difficult to determine whether the case
involved the creation of a new species of goods because it is clear that the
ingredients were mainly silver and the result of the process was fine silver
(from which one might infer no change in species) but it is also clear that the
product was an accumulation of fine and pure silver whereas the ingredient
coins certainly were not (from which one could infer a change in substance).
Cooke P. analysed the case as if there were no change in species. He considered
the chemical destruction of the coins to be inconsequential to the essence of the
transaction. Thus, applying the rules discussed earlier in respect of mixtures of
goods of the same species, he decided that:
"Until the company performed its contract to appropriate to Mr.
Harvey specific ingots, he should be treated as having a
proprietary interest in any silver to which his coins contributed.
Until then he had a share as a co-owner of each ingot in the
proportion of his total contribution to the refined silver."72
Had the court approached the matter as involving the creation of a new species
this conclusion would not have been open on the orthodox reasoning, although
it would have been available if the heterodox approach which has been
suggested were applied. It will therefore be clear that adoption of the heterodox
presumption will reduce the difficulty faced by courts in determining whether a
case has or has not involved the creation of a new species because, in terms of
the result which will be reached in individual cases, the difference would no
71 Supra.n.15.
72 Ibid. at 726 (emphasis added).
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longer be of such great consequence.
(4) Potential objections to the heterodox approach
Having established that it is possible for the law to accommodate the notion
of a supplier tracing its rights in raw goods into a product which has been
newly manufactured from them, a question still remains as to whether the
supplier ought to be permitted to do so. Objection might be levelled at the
approach suggested on the grounds that it will generally be obvious that the
goods sold are destined for use in a manufacturing process and yet, despite the
opportunity to incorporate a products clause into the contract, the supplier
chose to make no mention of ownership of the product in the agreement to sell.
As Bridge L.J. concluded in Borden:
"If a seller of goods to a manufacturer, who knows that his goods
are to be used in the manufacturing process before they are paid
for, wishes to reserve to himself an effective security for the
payment of the price, he cannot rely on a simple reservation of title
clause." 73
The objection, however, is not without answer. The fundamental response is
that by use of a simple retention of title clause the supplier has retained its full
legal rights in the goods supplied and is theoretically entitled to trace those
rights into the newly created goods. There is no proper justification for
thwarting those rights on policy grounds. Professor Goode has pointed out that:
"[A] seller who sells goods without reserving title or taking
security for the price cannot complain of his status as an unsecured
creditor, for ifhe has intentionally given up his proprietary rights
before the buyer's bankruptcy there is no reason why these should
be restored to him gratuitously by the law upon such
bankruptcy.'>74
But this does not accurately represent the position of the supplier who does
reserve title to the goods supplied. It has, in contradistinction to the unsecured
73 Borden (U.K) Ltd. v. Scottish Timber Products Ltd. supra.n.25 at 42.
74 Goode, "Ownership and Obligation in Commercial Transactions" (1987) 103L.Q.R.
433 at 440.
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creditors, taken a fonn of security which pennits it to claim ownership rights in
the product ahead of the unsecured creditors. If the supplier cannot follow the
rights which it has carefully reserved in the raw goods into the product then the
manufacturer would be free to use the goods as soon as they arrive, thereby
rendering nugatory the security which the retention of title clause was clearly
intended to provide. It is also relevant to consider the possibility that the
supplier might not have been aware at the time the contract was entered into
that the goods would be consumed in a manufacturing process prior to
payment. It should not suffer the loss of all security when it has taken steps to
secure payment of the price against the goods supplied - steps which exceed
any of those taken by the unsecured creditors. Furthennore, few would argue
that the supplier should not receive an interest in the product where the
consumption of the goods was wrongful, as for example in the unusual case
where raw goods are supplied on tenns which preclude their use until payment
but which are used nonetheless. In these circumstances most would agree that
the wronged supplier ought to be able to claim a proprietary interest of some
sort in the product. In light of the decision in The Ypatianna a similar
conclusion ought to follow where the mixing is foreseen or even consensual. 7S
Further objection might be taken with the analysis which I have proffered on
the basis that in the particular circumstances of a case it may well be difficult to
quantify the contributions of each party and there will therefore be difficulty in
arriving at the correct proportions for co-ownership. As Bridge L.J. put it in
Borden:
"[A] most intractable problem could, and in many cases would,
arise in quantifying the proportion of the value of the
manufactured product which the tracer could claim as properly
attributable to his ingredient." 76
However, this is really only an evidential matter for the parties to prove in
each case and it should not be allowed to negate the application of the
heterodox approach ab initio. As Davies has pointed out:
"[I]f the Borden decision is seen as authority for the proposition
7S Indian Oil Corp. Ltd. v. Greenstone Shipping SA. (Panama) (The Ypatianna)
supra.n.12.
76 Borden (UK) Ltd. v. Scottish Timber Products Ltd. supra.n.25 at 42.
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that the problem in quantifying values and appropriate ratios
makes it impossible for there to be any tracing into proceeds of a
manufactured article, then such a proposition isfar too wide." 77
It ought also to be remembered that there are methods available for dealing
with evidential problems. It is possible at times to presume that a contribution
occurred,78 and where a contribution is proven to have occurred but it is
difficult to ascertain its level the courts have been known to "cut the Gordian
knot" and make presumptions as to the level of the contribution from a
particular supplier. 79It also bears remembering that whilst The Ypatianna
eviscerated the 'penal' rule, it did not discard it altogether and so where
'intractable' evidential difficulties arise, rebuttable presumptions may still be
made against a tortious mixer.80
(5) Accession and fIXtures
In theory, the analysis developed above lends itself to cover even the smallest
addition to a large object whereby the inferior chattel loses its identity and
becomes a part of the dominant chattel. If the inferior chattel can be removed
without causing serious injury to either of the chattels concerned then each of
the chattels continues to belong to its owner as before. 81 However, where the
inferior chattel cannot be so removed, the orthodox doctrine of accession
provides that the inferior chattel accedes to the dominant chattel and title in the
77 Davies, "Reservation of title clauses: a legal quagmire?" [1984] L.MC.L.Q. 49 at 61
(emphasis added).
18 Spence v. UnionMarine Insurance Co. Ltd. supra.n.1O at 439; and Buckley v. Gross
supra.n.9 at 574-575; 216.
79 Spence v. UnionMarine Insurance Co. Ltd. ibid; see also Sandeman & Sons v. Tyzack
and Bran/oot Steamship Co. Ltd. supran.11 at 695, and Flavenc v. Bennett (1809) II East. 36;
103 E.R. 917, and Liggett v. Kensington [1993] I N.Z.L.R. 257 at 263, and Birks, supra.n.4 at
82-83, and Birks, supra.n.7 at 466-467; alternatively the parties may agree: see, e.g., Jones v.
Moore (1841) 4 Y. & C. 351; 160 E.R. 1041.
80 Indian Oil Corp. Ltd. v. Greenstone Shipping S.A. (Panama) (The Ypatianna)
supra.n.12 at 370-371, and Armory v. Delamirie supra.n.B.
81 See Thomas v. Robinson [1977] I N.Z.L.R. 385 at 391.
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inferior chattel thereby passes to the owner of the dominant chattel. 82If the
goods were supplied subject to a retention of title clause and the heterodox
analysis were applied it would require that the dominant chattel be co-owned in
proportion to the values contributed. This would be a laudable result in that it
would remove the difficult distinction between the creation of a new species of
goods and accession, 83but it could have the effect of rendering the commercial
world a mess of co-ownerships of chattels in minute percentages. Alternatively,
it may practically be the case that where such small additions are made the
inferior goods are not generally supplied subject to retention of title clauses and
so the problem would not arise.
This point requires closer consideration than is possible here but it might be
necessary to concede that accession remain a distinct doctrine due to its
commercial necessity. 84It could simply operate as an exception to the general
rule which I have suggested. By way of brief example, it is useful to recall
Bridge L.J.'s question of counsel in Borden: can the manufacturer of cattle cake
who sells it to a farmer, who in turn feeds it to his cattle, claim that the cow is a
'mixed fund' if the cake was initially sold subject to a retention of title
clause?85 Counsel conceded that it could not do so and attempted to distinguish
this scenario from the ability to trace raw materials into products on the basis
that the cattle cake is consumed. Naturally Bridge L.J. pointed out that this
distinction is illusory since raw materials are also consumed in the
manufacturing process, but his Lordship overlooked the possibility that his
example could be explained as an instance of accession which could operate as
an exception to the heterodox approach which counsel was also advancing.
It would likewise be possible to argue that fixtures fall under the general
approach suggested. However, the law relating to fixtures has arisen in
82 Ibid., and Zahnrad Fabrik Passau GmbH v. Terex Ltd. 1986 S.L.T. 84, and Hendy
Lennox (Industrial Engines) Ltd. v. Grahame PuttickLtd. [1984] 1 W.L.R. 485; cf, Matthews,
"Proprietary Claims at Common Law for Mixed and Improved Goods" (1981) 34 c.L.P. 159 at
171-185.
83 See Birks, supra.n.7 at 449-450.
84 McCormack, "Mixture of Goods" (1990) 10 Legal Studies 293 at 294-298, Davies,
"Reservation of title clauses: a legal quagmire?" [1984] L.MC.L.Q. 49 at 65-67, Birks, ibid.,
Palmer, Bailment (2nd ed., Law Book Company, 1991) at 162-163; Goode, supra.n.68 at 89-90.
8S Borden (U.K.) Ltd. v. Scottish Timber Products Ltd. supra.n.25 at 41.
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response to specific problems in the context of real property, 86 and it is
therefore probably also best understood as an exception to the general
principle. Again, it is beyond the scope of this article to consider that point in
any great depth.
EMPLOYMENT OF A PRODUCTS CLAUSE
It is perhaps not surprising that the legal position is different again where a
supplier has supplied raw goods subject to a contract which includes both
simple and products retention of title clauses and the goods are consumed in a
manufacturing process prior to payment. In Clough Mill Ltd. v. Martin Oliver
L.J., whilst formally reserving his opinion, stated that he could not see "any
reason in principle why the original legal title in a newly manufactured article
composed of materials belonging to A and B should not lie where A and B have
agreed that it shall lie. "87 Thus, the basic position is that where it has included a
products clause in addition to a simple clause the supplier can, pursuant to the
products clause, claim title to any new product created from its raw goods.
(a) Not Registrable Charges
However, this relatively simple conclusion is complicated, to the point of
confusion, by the statutory requirement that a charge created by a company will
be void as against the liquidator and creditors of that company unless it is
registered. 88 This is of particular concern in the present context in that if a
products clause is held to be a charge and it has not been registered then the
supplier will have effectively lost its security against the purchaser's
insolvency. The question therefore is whether or not a products clause is a
charge?
Despite the disarming simplicity with which the question may be stated, the
86 As to which see Goode, supra.n.68 at 89; Cooper, "Romalpa Clauses and Mortgages"
(1991) 5 B.CB. 281, Dukeson, "The ROT continues" [1993] N.ZLJ. 197, Dukeson, "The ROT
subsides (gradually)" [1994] N.l.L.J. 122, Whenuapai Joinery (1988) Ltd. v. Trust Bank Central
Ltd. [1994] 1 N.Z.L.R. 406, Lockwood Buildings Ltd. v. Trust Bank Canterbury Ltd. [1995] 1
N.Z.L.R. 22.
87 Supra.n.25 at 124.
88 Companies Act 1985 (UK), s.396, and Companies Act 1955 (NZ), ss. 102 & 103 (still
in force despite the 1993 Company Law Reforms in New Zealand: see Companies (Registration
of Charges) Act 1993 (NZ), ss. 3 & 4).
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orthodox answer is less clear and is not simply explained. It is well settled that
a simple clause does not constitute a registrable charge. 89This is simply
because a charge involves the charger, as owner of the goods to be charged,
granting the chargee an equitable security right over the goods. Where the
supplier of goods has incorporated a simple retention of title clause but the
purchaser has not paid for those goods:
"[N]o question of any charge by the buyer requiring registration
under section 95 of the Companies Act 1948 can arise because a
company can create a charge only on its own property and if it
never acquires property in the goods the subject of an agreement
for sale it cannot charge them.'>90
Thus, where a products clause is incorporated in the agreement to sell
alongside a simple clause there is no charge whilst the goods remain unused.
However, once the goods have been consumed in a manufacturing process and
a new species of goods has been created the new goods have a title which is
separate and distinct from those of the various constituent raw goods. In these
circumstances a products retention of title clause begins to bear something of
the semblance of a charge in that it records an agreement between the parties as
to where title in the product will vest. This, however, is also precisely why the
products clause is not a charge. The clause records a decision between the
parties as to where title in the new product will vest ab origine. It is therefore
not possible to say, as must be said if a charge is to be found, that one party has
conferred upon the other proprietary rights over goods which he or she owns.
In Clough Mill both Robert GoffL.J. and Oliver L.J. accepted, albeit obiter,
that a products clause does not necessarily constitute a registrable charge. As
Robert GoffL.J. put it:
"[T]he buyer does not confer on the supplier an interest in the
property defeasible upon payment of the debt; on the contrary
when the new goods come into existence the property in them ipso
89 See, e.g., McEntire v. Crossley Bros. Ltd. [1895] AC. 457, Armour v. Thyssen
Edelstahlwerke A.G. supra.n.35, Len Vidgen Ski & Leisure Ltd. v. Timaru Marine Supplies
(1982) Ltd. supra.n.61 at 352, Peerless Carpets Ltd. v. Moorhouse Carpet Market Ltd. (in rec)
(1992) 4 N.Z.B.L.C. 102,747 at 102, 754.
90 Supra.n.25 at 122per Oliver L.J.
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facto vests in the [supplier pursuant to the products clause], and
the [supplier] thereafter retains its ownership in them, in the same
way and on the same terms as the [supplier] retains its ownership
in the unused material." 91
However, having come to this conclusion his Lordship proceeded to suggest
that in the case at hand that could not have been the intention of the parties. He
pointed out that upon determination of the contract the product would be
owned by the supplier and that ownership would be indefeasible because the
contractual terms would have ceased to apply. As a result the creator could no
longer obtain title to the product by paying the price of the raw goods. His
Lordship was unable to believe that the parties could really have intended this
to be the case. As a result he suggested, obiter, that the parties must actually
have intended the products clause to create a charge over any products created,
even although it does violence to the language used by the parties to say SO.92
This conclusion is problematic for a number of reasons. First, Robert Goff
L.J. approached the interpretation of the products clause from the basis that the
parties cannot really have intended to pass full title in the product to the
supplier and therefore a charge must have been intended. With respect, it is
clear that the retention of title clause is employed as a form of security, but it is
also clear that the particular form of security chosen and recorded in writing in
the contract cannot properly be ignored in favour of a global consideration of
the substance of what was being attempted. 93 As Lord Watson put it in
McEntire v. Crossley Brothers Ltd.:
"[I]t is entirely beyond the function of a Court to discard the plain
meaning of any term in the agreement unless there can be found
within its four comers other language and other stipulations which
necessarily deprive such term of its primary significance.'>94
91 Ibid at 119 (emphasis original), and see at 124per Oliver L.J..
92 Ibid. at 120.
93 See, e.g., Re Bond WorthLtd. supra.n.30 at 245, and Clough Mill Ltd. v.Martin ibid.
at 115,121, 123, 125; cJ, Davies, Effective Retention of Title (Fourmat, 1991) at 81.
94 Supra.n.89 at 467; see also Bridge, "Form, Substance and Innovation in Personal
Property Security Law" [1992] J.B.L. 1 at 2.
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The second problem with the approach suggested by Robert GoffL.J.lies in
the theoretical methodology required to justify it. In order to say that a charge
has been created it is necessary to accept that title to the product vests in the
creator, even if only for a scintilla temporis, in order that the creator is then
capable of granting the supplier a proprietary interest in the product. 9S At first
blush it is rather surprising to fmd that this must be what the parties intended
when they wrote a contract saying that title to any products created from the
raw goods supplied will belong to the supplier. More importantly however, the
concept of property vesting in one place for a scintilla temporis and then
moving elsewhere has arisen in other areas of the law and has been rejected for
its artificiality. In the context of contracts which purport to assign future
property for consideration both the Court of Appeal of New Zealand 96 and the
House of Lords97 have held, rejecting arguments based around the scintilla
temporis concept, that the property belongs beneficially to the assignee as soon
as it comes into existence. 98 The situation where goods are supplied pursuant to,
inter alia, a products clause is directly analogous in that it too involves a
contract concerning property which has not yet come into existence. Once the
product has been created, ownership thereof ought to vest directly in the
supplier as the products clause stipulates. In this way, property in the product
never vests, not even for a scintilla temporis, in the manufacturer and so no
registrable charge has been created.
(b) Potential Problems
If these arguments are accepted there remain at least three difficulties which
need to be overcome. First, the courts refuse to accept that the supplier can own
the product and be owed the price of the raw goods supplied 99 so whilst the
contract remains on foot the supplier's title in the product has to remain
defeasible upon payment of the initially agreed price of the raw goods. This is
95 See, e.g., Re Bond Worth Ltd. supra.n.30 at 253-256.
96 Hadlee v. Commissioner of Inland Revenue [1991] 3 N.Z.L.R. 517 (point not taken on
appeal to the Privy Council: [1993] 2 N.Z.L.R. 385).
91 Abbey National Building Society v. Cann [1991] 1 A.C. 56.
98 Hadlee v. Commissioner of Inland Revenue supra.n.96 at 519-520 per Cooke P, and
at 526-528 per Richardson J.
99 E.g., Modelboard Ltd. v. Outer Box Ltd. supra.n.36 at 953.
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thought by some to provide support for the argument that a products clause
must be construed as a registrable charge. 100 However, the fact that the value of
the product is likely to be greater than that of the raw materials supplied and
that the supplier's title in the product will therefore be defeasible at a price
below its market value does not derogate from the simple principle that the
parties have agreed that title in the newly created product will only pass to the
creator when a certain sum of money has been paid. It is trite law that there is
no requirement in the law of contract for the consideration in a contract to be
"adequate". 101
A second issue which arises if the scintilla temporis approach is not adopted
revolves around the fact that if the supplier is endowed with title to the product
and the creator then becomes insolvent without having paid for the raw goods
the supplier will'receive a windfall of the value of the labour of the creator and
perhaps also raw goods belonging to the creator. However, this policy objection
can be responded to in several ways. First, it must be reiterated that the parties
have clearly provided for this result and therefore policy considerations should
not enter into the analysis. However this ignores the reality that they will enter
into the minds of judges and that they therefore require some thought. Many
arguments can be mounted using implied terms to compensate for the value of
goods supplied by the creator and for the value of any labour which the creator
may have supplied. However, these arguments tend to become rather complex
once the contract has been cancelled, and it is only at tllat point the supplier's
title in the product becomes indefeasible. It is, of course, possible to argue that
the implied duty to compensate is a secondary right 102 which only arises after
cancellation but all such arguments are inconsistent with the language and form
of the contract which the parties have chosen to enter into, in that they ignore
the concept of the supplier receiving full title to the product. A claim for
compensation might also be made as a matter of quantum meruit 103 although
100 See, e.g., Tatung (UK) Ltd v. Galex TelesureLtd. (1989) 5 B.C.L.C. 325 at 333, and
Compaq Computer Ltd. v. Abercorn Group Ltd. [1991]B.C.C. 484 at 498, andModelboard Ltd.
v. Outer Box Ltd. ibid.at 952-953.
101 See, e.g., Thomas v. Thomas (1842) 2 Q.B. 851.
102 Cf, Photo Production Ltd. v. Securicor Transport Ltd. [1980] AC. 827 at 848-850
per Lord Diplock.
103 As to which see Burrows, Finn, Todd, Cheshire & Fi/oot's Law of Contract (8th NZ
ed., Butterworths, 1992) at 756-759; and Funnston, Cheshire, Fi/oot and Furmston 's Law of
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such a claim would probably fail on the basis that the contract expressly
provides that the supplier will receive title to the product which legally requires
that it will receive the benefit of the creator's labour and goods. As such there
has been no unjust enrichment in the juristic sense.104
In recognition of the windfall point Professor Goode has argued that a
products clause is not a registrable charge where it provides for co-ownership
between the supplier and the creator rather than sole ownership by the supplier
of the raw goods. 105 With respect, such a response to the problem is wholly
illusory in theoretical terms as the parties are free to decide how ownership of
the newly created product will be vested ab origine. The precise manner in
which they do so ought to have no bearing whatsoever on the question of
whether the clause constitutes a registrable charge. Furthermore, on the analysis
suggested above, a co-ownership products clause would do nothing more than
simply re-state the common law position.
In New Zealand if the courts consider it unjust for the supplier not to
compensate the creator for the matters outlined above there remains the
possibility of providing relief under the Contractual Remedies Act 1979 (NZ).
Section 9 of that Act allows the court to give such relief as "is just and
practicable". 106 This power has been interpreted very broadly by the courts 107 as
Contract (12th.ed., Butterworths, 1991) at 669-672.
104 Paciocco, "The Remedial Constructive Trust: A Principled Basis for Priorities over
Creditors" (1989) 68 Can. Bar. Rev. 315 at 342; cf, New Zealand Forest Products Ltd. v.
Pongakawa Sawmill Ltd. supra.n.34 at 116-117.
lOS Goode, supra.n.68 at 97-99; and see Kruppstahl A.G. v. Quitmann Products Ltd.
[1982] I.L.R.M. 551; cf, de Lacy, "Anglo-Irish Retention of Title: The Current Position" (1987)
22 Irish Jurist 212 at 218-220.
106 Section 9(1) of the Contractual Remedies Act 1979 (NZ).
107 See Newmans Tours Ltd. v. Ranier Investments Ltd. [1992] 2 N.Z.L.R. 68, and
Coxhead v. Newmans Tours Ltd., unreported, Court of Appeal of New Zealand, CA 341/91,
7th. April, 1993, and Thomson v. Rankin [1993] 1 N.Z.L.R. 408; cj, Coote, "Remedy and Relief
under the Contractual Remedies Act 1979 (NZ)" (1993) 6 J.CL. 141, and Walker, "Section 9 of
the Contractual Remedies Act 1979: Opening Pandora's Box" (1994) 7 Auckland University Law
Review 527, and Coote, "The Changing New Zealand Law of Damages in Contract" - a paper
presented at the Sixth Annual Journal of Contract Law Conference, The Changing Law of
Contract, 14th. & 15th. August, 1995 in Auckland, New Zealand.
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"a valuable instrument for achieving justice." 108 As such it could probably be
used in these circumstances. Such an order remains illegitimate in theory,
however, as the parties have agreed in advance how the situation ought to be
disposed of. Thus, in theory, the position is no different to that in the United
Kingdom where there is no equivalent to the Contractual Remedies Act.
However, if the courts wish to enter into policy considerations then at least in
New Zealand it is possible to give vent to these via the Contractual Remedies
Act, rather than by illegitimately holding products clauses to be registrable
charges.
The final issue which deserves brief mention here concerns the not
uncommon position where a manufacturer uses raw goods in its process which
have been supplied by more than one supplier. If some or all of the suppliers
have supplied the raw materials subject to products clauses which purport to
retain to each supplier full title in any product created from the goods an
obvious problem arises. In fact, in Clough Mill Robert Goff L.J. considered this
to be a major problem in recognising products clauses as valid and enforceable
where they had not been registered as charges. 109 His Lordship was of the
opinion that this problem was best dealt with by considering each clause to be a
charge. Although it is not made clear he presumably thought that this would
avert the problem because the charges could somehow be ranked using the
normal rules of priority. It is suggested that a better solution to the problem of
multiple suppliers, all of whom employ products clauses, is to recognise all of
the suppliers as co-owners of the product (to the exclusion of the creator) in the
proportions which their respective contributions to the product bear to one
another. This does not give complete effect to the parties' intentions but these
were at variance anyhow and the approach suggested does give greater effect
than does the approach of Robert Goff L.J. to the intention of the suppliers that
the products clauses do not constitute registrable charges.
CONCLUSION
In Hendy Lennox (Industrial Engines) Ltd. v. Grahame Puttick Ltd.
Staughton 1. expressed his belief that:
lOB Thomson v. Rankin ibid.at 411 per Cooke P.
109 Supra.n.25 at 120.
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"[T]his area of the law is presently a maze if not a minefield, and
one [has] to proceed with caution for every step of the way." 110
With respect, the author is in agreement with this comment entirely and it is
hoped that this article has travelled some of the way toward mapping out at
least a part of that minefield.
In sum, it has been suggested that there is no theoretically valid justification
for the orthodox position that where raw goods are processed so as to create an
entirely new product, title in that product must vest in the creator. Instead, it is
suggested that a better approach is to recognise that the creator and supplier
together co-own the product in proportion to their respective contributions to
its creation. This is a more theoretically sound approach and it has additional
value in that it conforms to the current approach in cases where goods are
mixed but do not lose their identity as a species. In addition to these points the
currently favoured belief that employment of a products clause will involve the
creation of a registrable charge which will therefore be void as against
liquidators and creditors if it remains unregistered, has been challenged.
Instead, full effect ought to be given to such clauses and the title to any
products must vest in the parties as the products clause stipulates.This may
appear to be a harsh conclusion at times but it is the theoretically correct
solution and it is what the parties agreed to when they entered into the
agreement to sell!
110 Supra.n.82 at 493.
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